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Bank Loan Participations as Securities: Notes,
Investment Contracts, and the
Commercial/Investment Dichotomy
In a recent article, bannered Banks vs. Banks, the Wall Street
Journal reported a number of pending lawsuits which major Ameri-
can banks claim threaten their continued use of certain syndicated
loans in large international transactions by raising the possibility
that the banks organizing these loans will be held liable for losses
suffered by other banks participating in the loans.' The suits re-
ported involve participation loans, identical in substance to loan
participations commonly used in domestic banking. In such loans,
a participant bank purchases a portion of a loan made by a lead
bank and receives a certificate entitling it to a corresponding share
of the installments of principal and interest repaid to the lead bank.2
An important question presented in these pending lawsuits is
whether the participations are securities within the meaning of fed-
eral securities laws, principally the Securities Act of 19333 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.' In view of the greater possibility
under the federal statutes than under common law of a lead bank
1. Mathews, Banks vs. Banks, WALL STREEr J., Sept. 14, 1976, at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter
cited as Banks vs. Banks]. The article reports that much of the developing world's industrial
growth has been financed by American banks acting through group loans. Seven suits have
been filed in federal courts in New York, Philadelphia, and Texas, alleging a failure to
disclose material information in the sale of a group loan organized by European-American
Banking Corp. to finance E.M.J. Colocotronis, a Greek shipping firm which proved to be in
unsound financial condition. A total of about $19 million in damages is being claimed by
seven disgruntled loan participants. Id.
2. A Primer on Loan Participation, 10 THE BANKERS LgrrrE OF THE LAw, Sept. 1976, at 5
[hereinafter cited as Primer on Participation]. The terms "group loan," "syndicate," and
"participation" are often loosely used. The European-American Banking Corp. loan de-
scribed in the Wall Street Journal report was a true participation loan; the co-lenders pur-
chased a share of the large loan negotiated with the borrower by the lead bank, and received
participation certificates evidencing their right to share in the loan repayments received by
the lead bank. In a true syndicate loan, each bank separately negotiates with the borrower
and receives a promissory note for its contribution to the loan. See Banks vs. Banks, supra
note 1, at 1, col. 6.
3. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970) [hereinafter referred to as
Securities Act].
4. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1970) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as Exchange Act]. A general reference to both federal acts will refer to them as the
securities acts, or simply the acts.
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being held liable for fraud in the purchase or sale of a security, the
answer is important to all banks engaged in these transactions.
Although the few writers5 who have considered the question have
relied on Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central National Bank' to
conclude that the participant's interests are securities, significant
developments in the definitional law of the securities acts in the last
five years7 necessitate a reexamination of Lehigh Valley and a recon-
sideration of the status of these loan participations. The purpose of
this comment is to determine whether bank loan participations
should be classified as securities under the federal laws. To do so
requires a review of recent judicial interpretations of the federal
securities acts, particularly the courts' construction of the statutory
terms "note" and "investment contract," and the judicial creation
of a "commercial/investment dichotomy" to determine whether in-
terests are securities under the federal laws.8
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Loan Participation
The term "participation" is commonly, and often carelessly, used
to describe multi- or interbank loan transactions.' A true loan par-
ticipation occurs when a lending bank, the "lead" bank, sells an
undivided fractional interest in a loan and any collateral securing
it to one or more "participating" banks.'0 The participant has no
legal relationship with the borrower;" the participation certificate,
5. See Epstein, Bank Participation Agreements as Securities, 87 BANKING L.J. 99 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Epstein]; Issac, Loan Participations and the Securities Laws, 58 J.
CoM. BANK LENDING, Oct. 1975, at 50.
6. 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969). Lehigh Valley is the first reported case in which a bank
loan participation agreement was held to be a security. Other cases have implied that partici-
pations could be securities. See, e.g., NBI Mortgage Inv. Corp. v. Chemical Bank, [Current
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. $ 95,632 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1976); Crowell v. Pittsburgh &
L.E.R.R., 373 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (complicated transaction which closely resem-
bled a participation held to be a security).
7. See notes 41-139 and accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 41-108 and accompanying text infra.
9. Silberfeld, Inter-Bank Relationships in Loan Accounts; The Legal Label May Be
Important, 52 J. CoM. BANK LENDING, Nov. 1969, at 44.
10. Primer on Participation, supra note 2, at 5.
11. Id. See generally Armstrong, The Developing Law of Participation Agreements, 23
Bus. LAW. 689 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Armstrong]. The participant may have no per-
sonal relationship with the borrower, since loans are often participated to meet a customer's
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issued by the lead bank, evidences the participant's rights in the
borrower's payments of principal and interest, and in any collateral
held or obtained by the lead bank. 2 A number of reasons support
the practice of buying and selling participations. Participations
spread the risk associated with a loan; they permit a bank to service
the needs of a customer at times when it could not otherwise satisfy
those needs with its own funds; and they provide a source of income
for banks whose funds exceed loan demand.
Loan participations are not exclusively interbank transactions;
banks frequently participate in loans where the lead lender is a
finance company.'" A major source of loan participations is the cor-
respondent banking system, in which "country" respondents main-
tain a service relationship with "city" correspondents." A participa-
tion sold by a rural bank to the city correspondent is an "upstream"
needs without exposing him to competing banks. A lead bank may therefore not wish the
borrower to meet the participant. The borrower has no direct relationship to the participant;
he may not even know that participations have been sold in his loan. Id.
12. This comment is concerned with participation loans of this nature, which can be
distinguished from multi-bank or syndicate loans where each bank loans money directly to
the borrower, obtains a separate note for its share, and an "agent" bank is appointed to
administer the loan. See generally Stivers, An Analysis of the Techniques Utilized to Meet
the Loan Participation Needs of a Correspondent Bank, 53 J. COM. BANK LENDING, Dec. 1970,
at 34-35 [hereinafter cited as Stivers]. Although the agent bank may hold all the notes,
receive and transmit disbursements and repayments, and represent the lending banks in
dealing with the borrower, each bank has an independent legal relationship to the borrower
in the multi-bank or syndicate loans. Armstrong, supra note 11, at 689-90.
13. In one study, over half of the banks surveyed had at some time participated in loans
made by commercial finance companies. See Konrad, Participations with Finance
Companies, 50 J. COM. BANK LENDING, April 1968, at 37. This commonly occurs when the
prospective borrower is currently too great a financial risk for the bank to extend the loan
itself, but shows promise of developing into an acceptable customer. In these circumstances,
the loan is referred to a commercial finance company more experienced in administering high
risk loans, and the bank participates in the loan extended by the finance company. The
transaction often originates with the finance company. The combination of high interest rates
of the finance company and low interest rates of the bank results in a lower overall rate to
the borrower than if the finance company had extended the loan itself. The finance company
and bank share the risk and the practice constitutes a source of referrals for both. The bank
may retain the borrower's deposit account and may eventually gain the borrower as a prime
loan customer; at the same time, the transaction insulates the borrower from contact with
other banks. Id. See also Stone & Dorgan, A Different Approach to Commercial Finance
Company/Bank Participation Loans, 59 J. COM. BANK LENDING, Sept. 1976, at 23.
14. See generally SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE OF THE HousE COMM. ON BANKING AND
CURRENCY, 88TH CONG., 2D SESs., REPORT ON THE CORRESPONDENT BANKING SYSTM 2-4 (Sub-
comm. Print 1964) [hereinafter cited as 1964 REPORT]; Stivers, supra note 12; How Corre-
spondents Look at Loan Participations, 65 BANKING, Feb. 1973, at 20 [hereinafter cited as
Correspondents]; Ways to Improve Loan Participations, 66 BANKING, Sept. 1974, at 29.
Duquesne Law Review
participation and one originating with the city bank as lead is char-
acterized as "downstream."'" In general, the available capital and
the most attractive loan opportunities are located in the money-
center cities. The "country" areas suffer chronically from capital
shortages or sharp fluctuations in capital supply." Accordingly,
country respondents often seek to sell two types of participations.
An overline participation is offered for sale when the bank lacks
funds to meet a loan request, or when granting the loan would
violate the bank's legal lending limits. 7 Liquidity participations are
offered when the lender seeks to impove its cash position for its own
policy reasons, or in response to criticism by a governmental regula-
tory body. 8 In either case, the lead lender is enabled through partic-
ipations to satisfy the credit needs of its customers without the risk
of exposing them to competing lenders or losing their deposit ac-
counts."
Not all participations are upstream. Downstream participations
afford the country respondents an opportunity to share in attractive
loan assets otherwise foreclosed to them,20 and provide an avenue for
employing funds when local loan demand is low.2' Although partici-
pations are often bought and sold in a specific loan, a lead may form
and sell interests in a pool of loan assets.22 Whether the banks in-
volved are correspondents or not, the practice of participating loans
has proven to be an effective means of transferring funds between
areas of capital surplus and deficit.23 Many rural areas, because they
are primarily agricultural, suffer capital imbalance because of se-
vere seasonal fluctuations in availablity of funds and loan demand
and are generally capital poor in relation to their financing needs.
Rapidly developing regions, such as California and Colorado, may
also be capital poor.2 ' For these areas particularly, participated
15. Stivers, supra note 12, at 40.
16. See notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text infra.
17. Stivers, supra note 12, at 31-34. Since any bank may lack sufficient funds to meet loan
requests, country banks have also assisted city banks in times of capital shortages.
Correspondents, supra note 14, at 42.
18. Stivers, supra note 12, at 35-37, 38-40.
19. D. HAYES, BANK LENDING POLICIES 87-89 (XVI Mich. Bus. Studies No. 3, 1964).
20. Stivers, supra note 12, at 40.
21. Id. See also Correspondents, supra note 14, at 40.
22. Correspondents, supra note 14, at 40, 42.
23. See 1964 REPORT, supra note 14, at 3-4; Stivers, supra note 12, at 35-38; Cor-
respondents, supra note 14, at 42, 46, 50.
24. 1964 REPORT, supra note 14, at 4; Stivers, supra note 12, at 35-38; Correspondents,
supra note 14, at 42, 46, 50.
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loans provide a valuable capital resource. Participated loans, how-
ever, are subject to all the ordinary commercial risks associated with
loans. Since the participation is a nonrecourse sale of a share in the
loan asset,25 the lead and participants share pro rata in any loss if a
default occurs.
B. The Importance of Being a Security
A participant which suffers a loss as a result of fraud in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of a loan participation would generally
find greater protection under the federal securities acts than under
the common law." A private action for damages under the antifraud
sections of the securities acts,27 particularly rule 10b-5 promul-
gated under the Exchange Act,2 would be more advantageous than
a common law action primarily because the federal action, by the
terms of rule 10b-5, reaches factual omissions and half-truths as
well as actual misrepresentations." The major element to be proven
25. A sale of a participation is frequently offered on a nonrecourse basis, because the sale
would otherwise closely resemble an interbank loan, with attendant problems under the
banking laws. ROBERT MoRRIS AssocIATES, GuwiELiNEs FOR UPSTREAM DOWNSTREAM CORRE-
SPONDENT BANK LOAN PARTICIPATIONS 8 (1975); Correspondents, supra note 14, at 42.
26. 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAuD-SEC RULE 10b-5, §§ 2.7(1)-(2) (1975)
[hereinafter cited as BROMBERG].
27. See Securities Act of 1933, § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). See generally Simpson, Investors' Civil Remedies Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 12 DEPAuL L. REv. 71 (1961).
28. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Rule 10b-5, promulgated under the language of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), pursuant to the Securities Exchange Commission's rule-
making powers, substantially incorporates the language of § 17 of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970). Whereas § 17 of the Securities Act applies only to the sale of securities,
§ 10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule 10b-5 apply to their purchase or sale. See note 68 infra.
29. See note 28 supra. See also Bangs, Rule 10b-5 and the South Dakota Lawyer, 14
S.D.L. REV. 56, 79 (1969) (rule lOb-5 "is proving to be the most prolific source of litigation
since Henry Ford invented the flivver"). Under the common law, fraud consists only of active
misrepresentations. It ordinarily imposes no duty on an actor to voluntarily disclose material
1976-77
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 15: 261
is that the omitted or misleading information was "material," that
is, "a reasonable man would attach importance. . . to the informa-
tion in determining his choice of action in the transaction."30
Moreover, the common law fraud requirements of scienter, reli-
ance and causation are relaxed or even abrogated under rule 10b-
5. Scienter, the "mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipu-
late, or defraud,"3 seemed to have been virtually eliminated as an
element by the federal courts,32 until the Supreme Court recently
held that some proof of scienter on the part of the defendant was
necessary to maintain a rule 10b-5 action. Proof of reliance by the
plaintiff on the fraudulent statement, essential to a common law
action for misrepresentation, is not a significant obstacle in a federal
action when an omission of material fact is alleged. 4 Proof of causa-
tion remains undisputably essential to a federal securities fraud
action, but doubt exists about how proximate the causation must
be.35 Finally, a federal action under the securities acts possesses
attractive procedural features. Indeed, the classification of partici-
information. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933); RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 551(1) (1938); id. comment a.
30. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (1971) (emphasis in original).
31. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976).
32. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); 2 BROMBERG, supra note 26, at § 8.6(1).
33. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). The case involved the alleged
negligence of a corporation's auditors who failed to uncover fraud by the corporate manage-
ment. Although the opinion does not discuss the degree or nature of the scienter that is
required, the Court held that the plaintiff could not maintain the action solely on a theory of
negligent omission, without any allegation of scienter. Id. at 194-214.
34. 2 BROMBERG, supra note 26, at § 8.6(1).
35. 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3880-83 (1969); 2 BROMBERG, supra note 26, at §
8.7(1).
36. Section 27 of the Exchange Act, which confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the federal
courts for claims arising under it, provides liberal venue and service of process terms. 15
U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). Also, the provisions of the Exchange Act may not be waived, and any
clause in an agreement purporting in effect to waive the Act's provisions is invalid. Id. §
78cc(a). If a security transaction is present, stockholder derivative suits brought in federal
court may escape the prevalent state statutory requirement of the posting of security for costs
in advance of state actions. McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961); cf.
City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970);
Crowell v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 373 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Pa. 1974). In addition, the Ex-
change Act provides that "controlling persons" may be liable for fraudulent activities; control
persons may include officers, members of the board of directors, controlling shareholders, or
parent corporations. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970). See generally Comment, Commercial Notes
and Definition of "Security" Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note Is a Note Is a
Note?, 52 NEB. L. REv. 478, 506-10 (1973) [hereinafter cited as A Note Is].
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pations as securities might determine whether or not certain injured
participants may have any expectations of recovery of their losses
from participations sold to them without full disclosure of signifi-
cant facts. 7
II. THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
At present there appear to be two theories for concluding that a
loan participation is a security under the federal securities acts.
First, the participation may be included in the language, "any note
. . . or any certificate of interest or participation in. . .the forego-
ing, ' 3  under the Exchange Act. Under this approach, if the note
37. Furthermore, if a participation should be held subject to the registration provisions
of the Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970), its sale without registration could
be automatically rescinded within one year. Id. §§ 771(1), 77m. However, most participations
would almost certainly be exempt from registration as private offerings, assuming that only
a limited number of banks or similarly sophisticated financial institutions were solicited. Id.
§ 77d(2). According to a recent report, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
taken no action to compel the registration of participations. See also Banks vs. Banks, supra
note 1, at 1, col. 6.
38. Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act provides:
(a) When used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires-
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas,
or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certif-
icate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly known
as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or
banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine
months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is
likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970) (emphasis added).
Section 2(1) of the Securities Act provides that
When used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires-
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in
general, any interst or instrument commonly known as a "security", or any certificate
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guaran-
tee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
Distinctions have been noted between the definitions in the two acts, but the Supreme
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given by the borrower to the lead bank is a security under the Act,
then a participation sold in the note would also be a security. Sec-
ond, the sale of a participation may be an "investment contract"
under the securities acts, and thus a security regardless of the status
of the underlying note."
A. "Any Note" and the Commercial/Investment Dichotomy
Both securities acts provide that unless the context otherwise
requires any certificate of interest or participation in any note is a
security. 0 A loan participation undoubtedly falls within the literal
meaning of these words, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded as much in Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central National
Bank." Lehigh Valley involved a 10b-5 action alleging material
omissions and misleading disclosures. Appellant, Central National
Bank, was deeply committed in loans to Martin Von Zamft and
various corporations controlled by him, when one of the corpora-
tions, Larso Construction, approached it for additional credit. Satis-
faction of half of this request caused Central's commitment to Larso
to equal ten percent of its assets, and it was precluded by state law
from meeting the balance of the loan itself. To protect its enormous
interest, Central attempted what the court characterized as the
"ultimate bailout"-it offered the overline portion of the Larso loan
request for participation.2 Lehigh Valley participated in the loan;
it was informed that the Larso loan was secured by stock and
personal guarantees, but was not told of other factors which made
the loan a significant risk. 3
Court has indicated that they are not significant and has suggested that precedents under
the different definitions are interchangeable. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336, 342,
344 (1967). See generally Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk
in Defining Federal Securities, 25 HASTINGS L. J. 219, 220-23 nn.6-19 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Economic Reality].
39. Each of the securities acts includes "investment contract" in its definition of "secu-
rity." For the pertinent language of the acts see note 38 supra.
40. See note 38 supra.
41. 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969).
42. Id. at 991.
43. Lehigh Valley was not informed that the corporation whose stock secured the Larso
loan was already in reorganization proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act; that Von Zamft,
the prime guarantor, was then in default to Central on personal obligations; that bank
examiners had criticized the security on some of the other loans; that other banks were then
foreclosing on their collateral for other loans; and that Von Zamft's empire in general was
suffering serious financial problems. Id. at 990-91.
Vol. 15: 261
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Central contended on appeal that it was not liable since the Ex-
change Act and rule 10b-5 did not apply where no "security" was
involved. The court looked to the definition of "security" in the
Exchange Act, and observed that the language "any note" had been
"literally read by the judiciary to the extent that almost all notes
are held to be securities";44 this plainly included within the language
of the Act Larso's note to Central. Recognizing that Central was
charged not with the sale of the note but with the sale of a
participation in the note,45 the court was influenced by the strict
interpretation given to "any note,"4 and determined that it must
read the rest of the statute literally. The Fifth Circuit concluded
that the Lehigh Valley participation was a certificate of interest or
participation in a note within the coverage of the Exchange Act, and
hence was a security;47 it therefore permitted Lehigh Valley's cause
of action against Central under rule 10b-5 of the Act.
Since the Lehigh Valley decision, it has been accepted that an
interbank loan participation may be a security. 8 But developments
in the last few years make questionable the continued vitality of
Lehigh Valley. At least insofar as its holding was based on a literal
reading of the statute, as was its dictum that nearly all notes are
securities, it is no longer undisputable precedent. Rejecting the lit-
eral appproach, courts have held that not all notes are securities. 9
Lehigh Valley shortly preceded, and may have precipitated, a wave
of securities litigation in which the courts have struggled with the
statutory language in order to deny federal jurisdiction over many
transactions involving notes. 0 The judiciary's negative reaction to
44. Id. at 991-92.
45. Id. at 992.
46. Id. The court also was persuaded by its perception of a Supreme Court policy of
broadly reading the definition of security, and of construing the antifraud provisions of the
Exchange Act expansively. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969); Tcherepnin
v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967).
47. 409 F.2d at 992.
48. See, e.g., Avenue State Bank v. Tourtelot, 379 F. Supp. 250, 254 (N.D. Ill. 1974)
(dictum); Crowell v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R. Co., 373 F. Supp. 1303, 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
See also authorities cited at note 5 supra.
49. See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 n.14 (1975)
("with the exception of the Second Circuit, every Court of Appeals recently to consider the
issue has rejected the literal approach"). Of course, some notes are still held to be securities.
See notes 55-108 and accompanying text infra.
50. See, e.g., Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976);
Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d
546 (10th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974);
1976-77
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the proposition that Congress intended the securities acts to provide
every maker, payee, or transferee of every note a federal forum and
cause of action may seem reasonable.' Nevertheless, the relevant
definitional language of the two acts appears to be unambiguous in
meaning, and the exemption and exclusion provided for certain
notes are narrow.52 Courts were thus confronted with the question
of how Congress, by writing definitions of sweeping scope for securi-
ties, and providing only narrow exceptions, could not intend for
almost all notes to be regarded as securities. 3 An answer was found
Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3rd Cir. 1973); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463
F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1972).
51. The Securities Act defines "security" as being, inter alia, "any interest or instrument
commonly known as a 'security.'" 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970) (emphasis added). The Ex-
change Act includes within its coverage "any instrument commonly known as a 'security.'"
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970) (emphasis added). A House report on the Securities Act stated
that the definition of "security" was "in sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include
• . . the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary
concept of a security." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933) (emphasis added).
However, the acts were also intended to apply to certain novel or unusual types of interests
and transactions. See notes 109-39 and accompanying text infra.
52. Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act provides that a security within its coverage
"shall not include ... any note . . . which has a maturity at the time of the issuance of not
exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of
which is likewise limited." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970). Therefore, a note meeting the
criteria should not be subject to any term of the Exchange Act.
Section 3(a)(3) of the Securities Act states that unless expressly provided the Act shall not
apply to the following kinds of securities:
(3) Any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which arises out of a
current transaction or the proceeds of which have been or are to be used for current
transactions, and which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine
months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is
likewise limited ....
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1970). Section 17, the antifraud section of the Act, provides that the
exemption shall not apply to it. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(c) (1970). The notes described in § 3(a)(3)
of the Securities Act, therefore, are exempt from the Act's registration requirements, but not
its antifraud terms. Because nine month and shorter maturity notes are totally removed from
the Exchange Act under its definition of a security, the Exchange Act's removal of these notes
is referred to herein as an exclusion; because § 3(a)(3) of the Securities Act operates only to
remove nine month and shorter maturity notes from the Act's registration requirements, and
not its antifraud provisions, its removal is referred to as an exemption.
53. See, e.g., Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806, 808-09 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971):
If instruments used in every private loan transaction qualified as securities under the
federal statutes, our jurisdiction could be invoked with respect to any claim of fraud
in connection with the issuance of a check or note, no matter how small the transaction
... . We do not view this as the type of situation that prompted the enactment of
the federal securities laws. ...
1976-77 Comments
in the statutes' preface to their definitions, which provides for appli-
cation of the laws "unless the context otherwise requires"; the judi-
ciary has largely relied on this language to fashion an approach for
excluding transactions from the scope of the federal securities
laws."
Like the Lehigh Valley court, other federal courts had originally
construed the acts' references to "any note" literally in those cases
they had considered. 5 Doubts concerning the viability of the literal
approach first appeared in Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 51
where the district court refrained from applying a strictly literal
approach, although it held that a definition which purports to in-
clude "any note" must in effect apply to some notes. In the court's
view, if some notes were securities, the ones at issue clearly were;57
the implication, however, was that some notes were not securities.
The trend away from a literal application of the securities acts'
definitions developed with Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co.,58 a
class action against a broker-dealer for fraud connected with the
sale of short-term commercial paper. 9 The case is significant; al-
Upon turning to § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, however, we find that it provides, in
unequivocal and all-embracive language, that "The term 'security' means any note
There is no ambiguity in the language of §10(b). Nor does a literal reading of the
language defeat or hamper Congress' apparent purpose ...
Try as we may, we fail to detect in the 1934 Act any grant of discretionary power to
the court to construe the term "security" as including certain types of notes but not
others. Congress apparently decided that it would pass a sweeping prohibition rather
than attempt to draw such distinctions. We are bound by that decision.
54. Indeed, the Lehigh Valley decision has been criticized for failing to take into account
the language, "unless the context otherwise requires" found in § 3(a)(10) of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970). Epstein, supra note 5, at 102-03.
55. E.g., Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970); Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d
852 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 923 (1954); SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D.
Tex. 1961); SEC v. Vanco, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 422 (D.N.J. 1958).
56. 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
57. Id. at 663. The court was persuaded in Movielab that the transaction before it involved
a security; one publicly held company had purchased the assets of another in exchange for
installment notes running for twenty years, in the total principal amount of $10,500,000. The
appellant had argued that Congress could not have intended to open the federal courts to
every transaction, however small, involving a note. The court, however, was impressed by the
size of the notes and their exceptionally long term.
58. 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1972).
59. Commercial paper is unsecured, short-term corporate promissory notes, payable to
bearer, and supposedly issued only by well-known companies with financial positions beyond
question, for the purpose of financing current transactions of a definite seasonal or periodic
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though the Seventh Circuit held that "any note" means every note,
it did not apply the patently unambiguous final clause of the Ex-
change Act's definitions, which provides that any note with a matu-
rity not over nine months is not a security. 0 The court found the
clause contraditory when compared to the Securities Act, which
considers such notes securities, but exempts them from its registra-
tion provisions.' A note would be excluded from the Exchange Act
and thus immune to a fraud action under that Act, although it
remained subject to an action for fraud under the Securities Act.
The John Nuveen court felt this incongruity required it to construe
the meaning of the Exchange Act's exclusion. There being no legis-
lative history or other interpretive aids to assist in the construction
of the exclusion," the court relied on the legislative history of the
Securities Act's registration exemption to interpret and limit the
Exchange Act's exclusion. 3 Only well-secured, prime quality com-
mercial paper, issued to finance current business transactions and
of a type not ordinarily issued to the general public, were deter-
mined to fall within the provisions of the Securities Act's exemp-
tion." Notes meeting the criteria are commercial paper, are exempt
nature, the completion of which will coincide with the maturity of the commercial paper
issued to finance them. Handal, The Commercial Paper Market and the Securities Acts, 39
U. CHI. L. REv. 362, 363-64 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Commercial Paper].
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970). For the relevant statutory language see note 38 supra.
61. See note 52 supra.
62. See Commercial Paper, supra note 59, at 397.
63. 463 F.2d at 1078-80.
64. The exemption found at § 3(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3)
(1970), was written for commercial paper. The original draft of the Act contained no such
exemption; it was included principally at the urging of the Federal Reserve Board during
congressional committee hearings on the bill. Commercial Paper, supra note 59, at 381-82.
The Federal Reserve Board felt that the Securities Act was "not intended to apply . ..to
short-time paper issued for the purpose of obtaining funds for current transactions in com-
merce, industry, or agriculture and purchased by banks and corporations as a means of
employing temporarily idle funds." Letter from Chester Morrill, Secretary of the Federal
Reserve Board, to Senator Duncan V. Fletcher, April 3, 1933, in Hearings on S.875 Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 120 (1933). This commer-
cial paper was described in the hearings as having "a record of safety only second to Govern-
ment bonds." Id. at 94-95.
The SEC has interpreted the Securities Act exemption as applying only to prime quality
negotiable commercial paper, not ordinarily purchased by the general public, issued to facili-
tate well-recognized types of current operational business requirements, and eligible for
discounting by Federal Reserve banks. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4412 (Sept. 20,
1961) 17 C.F.R. § 231.4412 (1961). The "prime quality" nature of the paper, and its supposed
safety, supports the exemption. The current transactions requirement refers to the theore-
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from registration under the Securities Act, and, in the John Nuveen
court's view, are what the exclusion of the Exchange Act was in-
tended to exclude from the coverage of that Act. All other notes,
according to the court, are investment securities and subject to the
provisions of both acts.65 Since the notes at issue in John Nuveen
were offered to the public at large, were not prime, and did not
finance current transactions, they were the kind of security "in re-
gard to which the securities acts were intended to offer protection
against fraud, misrepresentation and non-disclosure.",
A new philosophy for dealing with notes had been suggested by
John Nuveen, and became a statement of law in Lino v. City Invest-
ing Co. 7 The Third Circuit ruled in Lino that the securities acts
were never intended to apply to a suit by the maker of notes given
in payment for the right to operate a business franchise." The Court
of appeals rested its decision squarely on the precatory introduction
to the definitions of both acts which states that the definitions apply
tically self-liquidating nature of commercial paper; the operation financed should pay its
return in time to meet the maturity date of the paper. Schweitzer, Commercial Paper and
the Securities Act of 1933: A Role for Registration, 63 GEo. L.J. 1245, 1246-48 (1975). It has
been argued that much commercial paper was not self-liquidating in 1933 and is not today;
that paper is not tied to specific current transactions, but is used as a general capital source
by continual "rolling over," that is, reissuing the paper as it matures, and paying off the first
note with the proceeds of the next. Id. at 1248-49.
65. The court stated:
In other words, when Congress spoke of notes with a maturity not exceeding nine
months, it meant commercial paper, not investment securities. When a prospective
borrower approaches a bank for a loan and gives his note in consideration for it, the
bank has purchased commercial paper. But a person who seeks to invest his money
and receives a note in return for it has not purchased commercial paper in the usual
sense. He has purchased a security investment.
463 F.2d at 1080 (footnotes omitted).
66. Id. at 1079. The Second Circuit concurred with this holding in Zeller v. Bogue Elec.
Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973), a derivative action by
stockholders of a subsidiary of Bogue. The plaintiffs alleged that Bogue had looted the
subsidiary by forcing it to loan money to its parent in exchange for notes which were alleged
to be securities. The court held that a maturity of less than nine months did not foreclose a
10b-5 action on a note unless the note fit the commercial paper criteria; it reasoned that the
securities acts were intended to protect investors and should be read accordingly. Id. at 800.
67. 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973).
68. Id. at 694-96. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act proscribes the use of "manipulative
or deceptive devices" in the "purchase or sale" of securities, and authorizes the SEC to
promulgate attendant regulations. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). Rule 10b-5, promulgated under
§ 10(b) of the Act, combines the purchase or sale feature of the Exchange Act's § 10(b), with
the broad antifraud language of § 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970), which
only reaches fraud in the sale of securities. For the text of the rule see note 28 supra.
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"unless the context otherwise requires."69 It found lacking in com-
mon sense the plaintiff's proposition that his "security" had been
purchased and paid for with a business franchise. Furthermore, the
Third Circuit could not accept the logical extension of the plaintiff's
proposition-that every consumer buying an article on credit has
sold a security to the retailer. Although the statutory language does
literally support that result, the court noted that nowhere in the
statutes or their legislative history is there any express reference to
consumer transactions.9 Since the court also determined that cer-
tain characteristics generally applicable to securities transactions7
were absent, it concluded that no security was involved due to the
"commercial context" of the transaction at issue.72 In the court's
view, Congress had specifically instructed the courts through its
precatory language that some transactions would fall outside the
spirit and intention of the law; in Lino, the commercial context of
the transaction would require the conclusion that the transaction
was without the acts' broad coverage.7 3
69. The court reasoned that
[tihe commercial context of this case requires a holding that the transaction did not
involve a "purchase" of securities. These were personal promissory notes issued by a
private party. There was no public offering of the notes, and the issuer was the person
claiming to be defrauded. The notes were not procured for speculation or investment,
and there is no indication that [the payee] was soliciting venture capital from Lino.
487 F.2d at 694-95.
70. Id. at 695.
71. See note 69 supra.
72. 487 F.2d at 694-96.
73. Id. at 695. The court relied on the Supreme Court's observation in Holy Trinity
Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) that "a thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention
of its makers." Id. at 458-59. Curiously, the court did not acknowledge a frequently cited
authority which seems particularly to support its conclusion-SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), in which the Supreme Court, interpreting § 2(1) of the Securities
Act, stated that the rules of statutory construction long have been subordinated to the
doctrine that courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating
general purpose, will read text in the light of context and will interpret the text so far as the
meaning of the words fairly permits so as to carry out in particular cases the generally
expressed legislative policy. Id. at 350-51. In this context, the generally expressed legislative
policy was the protection of investors. See Message of President Roosevelt to Congress, Mar.
29, 1933, in S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1933); Message of President Roosevelt to
Congress, Feb. 9, 1934, S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934). The Senate report on
the Securities Act notes that the "purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and
honest business. The basic policy is that of informing the investor of the facts concerning
securities . . . and providing protection against fraud and misrepresentation." S. REp. No.
47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933) (emphasis added).
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Although a few district courts had previously held that certain
notes were not securities," Lino represents the first appellate court
determination that a note came under the language, "unless the
context otherwise requires." It was also the first significant judicial
attempt to articulate a theory for future decisions by listing the
factors determinative of a "securities context." Other courts quickly
followed Lino's lead.7" In Bellah v. First National Bank,7" the nine
month maturity exclusion of the Exchange Act was held to apply
to plaintiffs' notes because they were "commercial," not investment
in context. The Be~lah court emphasized that in extending the loan,
the bank merely intended to aid the plaintiffs in the operation of
their business, not "to profit from the successful operation of [the]
enterprise."77 The court stated as a general conclusion that "notes
issued in the context of a commercial loan transaction fall beyond
the purview of the [Exchange] Act."78 McClure v. First National
The "context over text" principle of construction, recognized in Joiner, was used in that
case and has since been relied on to assist courts in determining whether specific interests at
issue should be classified as securities. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 339
(1967). The "context over text" principle and the "substance over form" doctrine, enunciated
in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946), were applied in United Housing Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852-58 (1975), in its reasoning that "stock" in a low income
housing project was not a security. See also Avenue State Bank v. Tourtelot, 379 F. Supp.
250, 253 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Pasquesi, The Expanding "Securities" Concept, 49 ILL. B.J. 728,
732 (1961).
74. E.g., City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 209 F. Supp. 592, 608 (W.D. Ark. 1968), aff'd
on other grounds, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); SEC v. Fifth Ave.
Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd on other grounds, 435 F.2d 510 (2d
Cir. 1970).
75. See, e.g., Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Continental
Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974). Compare Lipton & Katz, "Notes" Are (Are
Not?) Always Securities, 29 Bus. LAW. 861 (1974), with Lipton & Katz, "Notes" Are Not
Always Securities, 30 Bus. LAw. 763 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Lipton & Katz].
76. 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974).
77. Id. at 1113. The Bellah court apparently coined the phrase "commercial-investment
dichotomy," by which the doctrine of the duality of notes has come to be referred. See id. at
1112 n.3.
78. Id. at 1114. The court also reasoned that to construe such notes as securities would
necessitate requiring their registration, which would "inevitably wreak havoc on the commer-
cial paper market." Id. This argument seems to be a makeweight, or rather a naive position
in view of the Securities Act's exemption relative to private offerings, which would almost
certainly apply to a transaction between a single borrower and a single bank. See Securities
Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970). The court in Bellah was doubtful that constru-
ing the note as a security would comport with congressional intent, and stated that the acts
"create for participants in note transactions a broad but nevertheless not boundless federal
forum for vindicating their grievances. We doubt that Congress intended by these Acts to
render federal judges the guardians of all beguiled markers or payees." 495 F.2d at 1114.
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Bank7" presented another securities acts suit by a note maker alleg-
ing that fraud was involved in the grant of a bank loan. The princi-
pal difference from the earlier cases was that the note involved in
McClure had a maturity period beyond nine months. Under pre-
vious decisions, this transaction should have been covered by the
Exchange Act regardless of its commercial or investment nature.80
The McClure court reasoned, however, that the commercial/
investment analysis evolved in John Nuveen, Lino and Bellah was
not limited in its effect to the Exchange Act's exclusion clause
and the Securities Act's registration exemption, but went directly
to the determination of what was or was not a security. The court
concluded that its "investment" nature is the central feature of a
security; therefore, a note which is part of a commercial transaction
is not a security and is not subject to the Exchange Act despite its
maturity period.8 In the view of the court in McClure, the com-
mercial or investment features, not the Exchange Act exclusion, are
determinative of whether or not "any note" is a security.2
The investment/commercial approach for distinguishing notes
which are securities from those which are not appears to be reasona-
ble in theory. Yet while the courts have professed to know them
when they see them, they have not been particularly adept at ex-
pressing standards or criteria for determining whether a note is a
79. 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975).
80. The exclusion of § 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970), is
available only to notes with a maturity not exceeding nine months. Previous cases had only
dealt with notes with maturity under nine months. See, e.g., Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495
F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974).
81. 497 F.2d at 493-95. The court frankly admitted:
We realize that our holding today that the Act does not apply to commercial notes of
a longer duration than nine months, taken with the decisions voiding the short-term
exemption as to investment paper, virtually writes that exemption out of the law ....
Thus, the investment or commercial nature of a note entirely controls the applicability
of the Act, depriving of all utility the exemption based on maturity length.
Id. at 494-95. The court recognized that its holding could not be squared with the express
language of § 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act:
The original scrivener of the definitional section may well wonder what happened to
his carefully drawn exemption on the way to the courthouse, but if the judicial deci-
sions do not properly reflect the intent of Congress as to the coverage of the Act, only
that body can properly rectify the situation at this point,'if stare decisis is to apply
and the Supreme Court does not make some definitive decision contrary to the pres-
ently decided cases.
Id. at 495.
82. Id. at 494-95.
Vol. 15: 261
Comments
security under the investment/commercial analysis." A review of
the cases does suggest some factors bearing on whether the note is
a security under the commercial/investment dichotomy. Under the
guidance of Lino and McClure, a court may inquire whether there
was any public offering, or whether the notes were acquired for
speculation or investment. 4 Bellah perhaps would suggest only a
different phrasing of the latter question: did the lender intend to
profit from the successful operation of the borrower's business?85 In
all, the criteria proposed in these and other cases have focused on
the borrower's use of the proceeds to determine the nature of the
lender's interest. Are they used to promote a new corporation or bail
out a foundering one (that is, do they involve risk or venture
capital)?" Are the proceeds used to finance ongoing operations,
or are they used to acquire capital assets? 87 If used for capital as-
sets, does the lender take a purchase money security interest in the
specific asset, or an interest in all the borrower's assets, or is the
loan unsecured?88
The essence of investing is the expectation by the investor that
he will realize some return from the investee's employment of his
contribution. Recognizing this basic requirement, there has been
unanimous assent that a note issued in connection with a sale of
consumer goods or services is not a security. The lender who ac-
83. For example, in McClure, after concluding that the investment nature of the transac-
tion determined whether a note was a security, the court noted that an investment transac-
tion would generally be indicated if the notes were offered to a class of investors, or acquired
by the payees for speculation or investment, or if the payees acquired investment assets. 497
F.2d at 493, 494.
84. See notes 67-74 & 79-82 and accompanying text supra.
85. See 495 F.2d at 1113.
86. See Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 551-52 (10th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Continental
Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 523-27 (5th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d
689, 694-95 (3d Cir. 1973). See generally Economic Reality, supra note 38.
87. See Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662, 663 (2d Cir. 1971) (purchase
of corporate assets); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970) (sale of real property);
Thorp Comm. Corp. v. Northgate Indus., Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 94,929 (D. Minn. 1974) (accounts receivable financing by commercial credit com-
pany).
88. See generally Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976); Lipton
& Katz, supra note 75, at 776-70; A Note Is, supra note 36, at 510-12.
89. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (purchasers of stock
in a housing cooperative motivated by desire to obtain place to live, not profit); Zabriskie v.
Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974) (if a note is given in a consumer purchase it is not a




cepts a note in return for financing a new television set expects to
be repaid with interest, but does not expect the borrower to earn the
interest through his use of the loan proceeds; thus, financing of a
consumer transaction reasonably does not involve the sale of a secu-
rity.
In other contexts, a predictable and satisfactory method of apply-
ing the commercial/investment analysis to determine the security
status of notes has not been developed. Two cases recently reported
acknowledged this problem and suggested different solutions. In
Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz,90 the Ninth Circuit, in a per
curiam opinion holding that the note at issue was not a security,
rejected the complaint as "another attempt to convert Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act into a source of general federal juris-
diction." 9' The test for a security (or for an "investment") developed
by the Ninth Circuit is whether the lender has contributed "risk
capital" subject to the "entrepreneurial or managerial efforts" of
the borrower. 2 Because the loan agreement in Great Western was
carefully tailored to the bank's requirements, placing extensive re-
strictions on the borrower's use of the loan proceeds and the conduct
of its financial operations, the loan was not regarded as risk capital
subject to the borrower's "essential managerial efforts," but was
simply a commercial loan subject to the risks normally attendant
on such loans." The court concluded that a note given to a bank is
generally not a security." A concurring opinion in Great Western
90. 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
91. Id. at 1253.
92. Id. at 1257. The court stated that the "risk capital" test was their version of the
commercial/investment dichotomy, and that a risk capital contribution-an invest-
ment-must be distinguished from a risky loan-a commercial transaction. It listed a number
of factors to be considered. See id. at 1257-58. The risk of loss varies with the length of time
the money is to be on loan, the extent of collateralization, the form of the obligation, the
circumstances under which the note was issued, the relationship of the parties, and the
contemplated use of the proceeds, among other factors. Id.
93. Id. at 1259-60.
94. It was stated:
[Tihe promissory note given ...bears no economic resemblance to the "securities"
defined by the 1933 and 1934 acts.
A note given to a bank in the course of a commercial financing transaction is not
generally a security within the meaning of the federal securities acts. To expand the
reach of those acts to ordinary commercial loan transactions would distort congres-




written by Judge Wright went further. 5 The judge noted that there
is no indication in the securities acts that Congress intended to
include commercial financing within their protection; as the
McClure court had concluded, the reality of commercial bank lend-
ing is totally unrelated to the abuses involved in trading for specula-
tion or investment that Congress sought to eliminate through the
Exchange Act." Moreover, Judge Wright also argued that banks,
unlike investors covered under the acts, have the ability to gather
information about borrowers and protect themselves from fraud.
The majority and concurring opinions in Great Western, when
read together, seem to imply that a bank loan is presumptively not
an investment, and hence not a security. That was the inference
drawn from the decision by the Second Circuit in Exchange Na-
tional Bank v. Touche Ross & Co. 7 The court did conclude that
notes given the Exchange National Bank were securities under the
commercial/investment test,9" but principally devoted its opinion to
criticizing that test and the view expressed in Great Western. The
Exchange National Bank court surmised that it was Judge Wright's
position that the federal securities acts should not apply to notes
received by a bank in what purports to be an exercise of its lending
function,9 a view the Second Circuit found appealing because it was
dissatisfied with previous efforts to provide meaningful criteria for
a case by case determination utilizing the commercial/investment
analysis. Judge Wright's reasoning offered at least a modicum of
certainty"'0 to those grappling with the problem of determining a
security vel non. Nevertheless, largely because it felt his view mis-
95. Id. at 1260-62 (Wright, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 1260, citing McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 352 F. Supp. 454, 458 (N.D. Tex.
1973).
97. 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976). The borrower was a brokerage firm and member of the
New York Stock Exchange. There were strict limitations on the collectibility of the subordi-
nated, unsecured notes, based on the Exchange's capitalization requirements for member
firms. The loan was not an isolated transaction, but was part of a large-scale financing
operation involving 19 lenders.
98. Id. at 1138-39.
99. See text accompanying notes 85 & 96 supra.
100. 544 F.2d at 1136-37. The court observed:
Directing courts to "weigh" a number of such dubious factors, without any instructions
as to relative weights . . . is scarcely helpful to hard-pressed district judges or to
counsel. Adoption of Judge Wright's view thus would afford the hope of bringing a
modicum of certainty into one large section of a field in bad need of it.
Id. at 1137.
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construed the protection offered by the acts, the court did not adopt
Judge Wright's position.1'" It concluded that the best alternative
was to follow more closely the language of the acts, which include
as a security every note with a maturity over nine months, unless
the party asserting there is no security proves that the context
requires otherwise.""2 Whereas Great Western suggested that a bank
loan presumptively did not involve a security, Exchange National
Bank proposed the converse, a presumption that a note involved in
a bank loan is a security.03
Although a majority of the decisions since Lehigh Valley have
held notes at issue to be securities,' 4 Lehigh Valley's literal ap-
proach to interpreting "any note" has been replaced by analysis
under the commercial/investment dichotomy. Applying this ap-
proach, in virtually every determination of the status of a note is-
sued in a bank loan transaction, the courts have concluded that the
note was not a security."'5 Unless there is intervention by Congress
or the Supreme Court'"' to clarify the status of banking transactions
under the securities acts, or unless the Second Circuit's new literal-
101. In the court's view, Judge Wright's position was largely based on the perceived
ability of banks to gather information and to protect themselves from fraud, and the conclu-
sion that they were not in need of the protection of the securities acts. It noted, however, that
the Exchange Act reaches fraud in the "purchase or sale" of securities, not just in their sale;
many -of the recent cases involved claims of fraud by the makers of notes "purchased" by
banks. The Second Circuit argued that even if it were banks claiming fraud, the statutes'
antifraud provisions should apply where a bank or group of banks loaned millions of dollars
to a borrower for a term of years. The court reasoned that a bank's ability to obtain disclosure
cannot always prevent fraud. Id. at 1137. See notes 156-63 and accompanying text infra.
102. Id. at 1137-38. The court was able to suggest several cases where the context of the
transaction would require the note to be outside the acts' protection-consumer financing,
home mortgages, a short-term note secured by a lien on the assets of a small business,
accounts receivable financing, or a note evidencing open-account debt in the ordinary course
of business.
103. Id. at 1138. Once again it was emphasized that there was a need for congressional
explanation of the meaning of "note" in the acts' definitions.
104. See, e.g., Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976);
Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp.,
497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1972);
Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
105. See Great W. Bank v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1260 (9th Cir. 1976) (Wright, J., concur-
ring) and cases cited therein.
106. The Supreme Court has not granted certiorari for review of these decisions. See, e.g.,
C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 825 (1975); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 930 (1975); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1009 (1972).
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ism gains judicial acceptance, 07 it is probable that notes issued for
future bank loans will not be regarded as securities in the absence
of specific, particular circumstances. 0 1
B. The Investment Contract
As the Lehigh Valley court observed, the lead bank-defendant
therein was not charged with fraud in the sale of a note, but in the
sale of a participation in the note. '"9 After enumerating the specific
instruments which constitute securities, the securities acts provide
that any "certificate of interest or participation in" any of the
named instruments is also a security; in other words, a participation
in a security is a security. If the borrower's note given to a lead bank
is a security, as at least some are, then a participation in it should
clearly be a security.
If held to be an "investment contract,""10 a loan participation
would be a security regardless of the status of the underlying note.
The federal securities acts utilize the term "investment contract"
as a catchall; after listing specific, commonly understood instru-
ments such as stocks, bonds, and notes, the acts include in their
definitions of a security the term "investment contract," appar-
ently, to protect investors from imaginative schemes which have the
characteristics of securities but differ from the instruments speci-
fied."' The term "investment contract" is undefined in the acts
themselves or in their legislative histories,"' leaving the task of its
107. Since the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have already recognized
and applied the commercial/investment analysis, it is unlikely that the Second Circuit's
literal approach to the securities acts will be adopted. See cases cited at note 50 supra. In
addition, the First Circuit seems to have accepted the commercial/investment dichotomy for
analyzing security-like transactions. See Spencer Cos. v. Armonk Indus., Inc., 489 F.2d 704
(lst Cir. 1973). District courts in the Eighth Circuit have also utilized the approach. See, e.g.,
Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 307, 313 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
108. See, e.g., Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976)
(loan proceeds used to satisfy capital requirements). See also notes 99-106 and accompanying
text supra.
109. 409 F.2d at 992.
110. Both securities acts include "investment contract" in their lists of instruments which
are considered to be securities for the purposes of the acts. See note 38 supra for the pertinent
statutory language.
111. See, e.g., Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream
of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. Rxv. 135, 138 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Investment
Contracts]. The federal securities acts adopted the same definitional strategy as state blue
sky laws, naming specific instruments and including nonspecific descriptive terms such as
"profit-sharing agreement" and "investment contract" in their explication of a security. See
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
112. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
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construction to the courts. In deciding whether challenged interests
fall within the term, the court's inquiry must go beyond the transac-
tion's form to its substance; it is in determining whether the sub-
stance of a transaction constitutes an investment contract that
courts often pronounce their views on the attributes of a security."'
Although interests alleged to constitute investment contracts
have been considered by the Supreme Court a number of times, 14
the relevant law has undergone little change since two Supreme
Court decisions in the mid-forties. In SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp.,"' the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) sought to re-
strain the company from continuing to violate the Securities Act by
selling unregistered investment contracts. Joiner assigned small
leases in a large potential oil territory leased by the company. The
land was worthless without the successful completion of a test well.
The offer of the leases to potential assignees was promoted through
reference to the test well to be drilled by the company, but the
assignees were not informed that the test well was in fact being
financed by the sale of the assignments. The court of appeals re-
garded the assignments as interests in real property and therefore
not securities."' The Supreme Court, however, found the assign-
ments to be interests in the oil exploration enterprise since the well-
drilling undertaking gave the instruments their only value and ap-
peal. The Court reasoned that the trading "had all the evils inherent
in the securities transactions which it was the aim of the Securities
Act to end.""' 7 According to the Court, securities under the Act
encompass documents "in which there is common trading for specu-
113. See, e.g.. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851-52 (1975)
(footnotes omitted):
[W]e again must examine the substance-the economic realities of the transac-
tion-rather than the names that may have been employed by the parties. . . . [Tihe
basic test for distinguishing the transaction from other commercial dealings is
"whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise
with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." . . .
This test, in shorthand form, embodies the essential attributes that run through all of
the Court's decisions defining a security.
114. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC
v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293
(1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
115. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
116. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 133 F.2d 241 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
117. 320 U.S. at 349.
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lation or investment.""' The general term "investment contract"
was determined by the Court to reach devices, whatever their ap-
pearance, which could be proven to have been "widely offered or
dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which established their
character in commerce as 'investment contracts,'. or as 'any interest
or instrument commonly known as a "security" ' "I" In the Court's
view, the applicable test was "what character the instrument is
given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution,
and the economic inducements held out to the prospect."' 2 It held
that the assignments constituted securities on the basis of the actual
interests involved, as well as on the basis of the promoter's represen-
tations of the nature of the transaction. 2'
The Supreme Court's discussion of "investment contract" and
the test it applied in Joiner were expressed in extremely general
terms. Three years later, in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 21 the Court's
definition of an investment contract was more specific. Another
target of SEC injunctive action, Howey owned citrus groves in Flor-
ida; the company offered and sold small interests in this property,
generally tied to long-term service contracts under which Howey
operated the property exclusively and the property owner shared pro
rata in Howey's annual profits.1n In effect, Howey raised operating
capital by "selling" portions of its holdings, and the "buyer" ac-
quired a share in Howey's total operation. The Court held that
together the sale and offer of service contract constituted an invest-
ment contract. It acknowledged that in state courts "investment
contract" had come to mean "a contract or scheme for 'the placing
of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income
or profit from its employment."" 4 The Supreme Court defined an
"investment contract" under the Securities Act as: (1) the invest-
118. Id. at 351.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 352-53.
121. Id. at 353.
122. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
123. The operation was in fact highly profitable. Id. at 296. To the Court that was imma-
terial; where a scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits
coming solely from the efforts of others, "it is immaterial whether the enterprise is speculative
or non-speculative or whether there is a sale of property with or without intrinsic value." Id.
at 301.
124. Id. at 298, quoting State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W.
937, 938 (1920).
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ment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) expecting to earn
profit, (4) solely from the efforts of another employing, in part, the
investment. 125
This definition has, with some modifications, remained vital.,"
Under the Supreme Court's test, an investment may apparently be
of something other than money; for example, it may involve the
contribution of labor.'2 "Profit" earned may 4je income, as well as
capital appreciation. 2 8 The only significant modification of the
Howey definition has been in regard to the language "solely from
the efforts of others." In the last decade there has been a prolifera-
tion of franchise and pyramid investment schemes which require at
least token involvement by the participant in the scheme. 29 Recog-
nizing that promoters could elude the reach of the securities acts by
involving their prospective investors in an insignificant way, with-
out permitting the investor to have any real managerial role in the
125. 328 U.S. at 299.
126. The Supreme Court applied the Howey test in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332
(1967). The test was reaffirmed in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837
(1975).
127. E.g., SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709, 722 (N.D. Tex. 1961) (oral agreement that
unpaid laborers would share in profits of mining operation is a security). See also Investment
Contracts, supra note 111, at 161-62.
128. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 855 (1975). Profit may
be any benefit other than wages. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361
P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). See also Investment Contracts, supra note 111, at 164-67.
For example, participation in a union pension plan has been held to constitute an investment
contract in Daniel v. Teamsters Union, 410 F. Supp. 541 (N.D.Ill. 1976), noted in 15 DuQ. L.
REav. 359 (1977). Some courts have reasoned that the criterion should not be the expectation
of profit, but rather the "risk" involved-whether the investor's contribution is in substantial
jeopardy, as in the promotion of a new enterprise, or the continuation of a financially insecure
one. This factor has been termed variously "risk," "risk capital," and "venture capital." See,
e.g., El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900
(1974); Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186
(1961); State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971). See also
Economic Reality, supra note 38; Investment Contracts, supra note 111, at 167-70.
129. In 1973 alone, the ubiquitous Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc. and its subsidiaries,
Dare to be Great, Inc. and Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., were the subject of 17 actions in ten
federal districts. In re Glenn W. Turner Enterprises Litigation, 355 F. Supp. 1402, 1403. (Jud.
Pan. Multidist. Litigation 1973). The common threshold question in these actions was
whether the various pyramidal promotion and sales schemes constituted investment con-
tracts under the securities acts, since each scheme to some extent involved the "investors"
in its operation. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974);
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
821 (1973).
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venture, various courts have deemphasized the word "solely,"130
until the Supreme Court itself apparently modified its Howey stand
in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman.3' In a footnote to
its opinion the Court stated that it expressed no view on the Ninth
Circuit's conclusion that a court need not construe "solely" liter-
ally. 32 In the text of its opinion, however, the Court characterized
the test for an investment contract as involving "profits to be de-
rived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others,' ' 3
suggesting, perhaps, that the efforts need not be solely those of the
promoter or third persons.
The Howey test for an investment contract was recently applied
in the only case since Lehigh Valley to consider the question of
whether bank loan participations are securities, NBI Mortgage In-
vestment Corp. v. Chemical Bank. 34 The defendant bank had
moved for a partial summary judgment on the ground that the loan
participation sued on was not a security. While the plaintiff relied
on Lehigh Valley, the defendant relied on the later McClure case,
arguing that there was no distinction between the initial issuance
of a commercial loan by a bank supported by a note, and the later
sale of a participation in the loan. The court responded that the
defendant had ignored the difference between self-effort and the
efforts of others.'1 Since the record disclosed that the plaintiff par-
ticipant had no managerial responsibility for the loan which was
handled by the lead, had purchased the participation in the expec-
tation of profits, 3 ' and had apparently relied on the lead's manage-
rial efforts, the court could not conclude that this loan participation
was not a security. 37
130. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 481-83 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). The Ninth Circuit held that in light of the remedial nature
of the legislation and Supreme Court "admonitions that the definition of securities should
be a flexible one, the word 'solely' should not be read as a strict or literal limitation on the
definition of an investment contract." Id. at 482. The court observed that adherence to a strict
"interpretation could result in a mechanical, unduly restrictive view of what is and what is
not an investment contract," which would be easy to evade and would not serve the purposes
of the legislation. Id.
131. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
132. Id. at 852 n.16.
133. Id. at 852.
134. [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95, 632 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1976).
135. Id. at 90,147.
136. Id. See note 128 and accompanying text supra.
137. [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. at 90,147-48.
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In view of the decision in NBI Mortgage, it is quite likely that a
loan participation may be held to be a security by virtue of its
investment nature. The participant (1) purchases its interest-its
investment, (2) in an existing or contemplated loan-a common
enterprise between the lead and the participant, (3) expecting
profit-the return of its principal plus interest, (4) from the entre-
preneurial or managerial efforts of another-the lead acquires the
customer, negotiates and monitors the loan, and manages its repay-
ment or remedies on default. Clearly, the elements of the Howey
test are present in such a transaction. Of course, the precatory lan-
guage of both the securities acts, "unless the context otherwise re-
quires," applies to investment contracts, and those courts which
have adopted the commercial/investment dichotomy for determin-
ing the securities status of notes may extend that analysis to partici-
pations in notes. Since those courts tend to view bank loans as
"commercial," rather than "investment," transactions because it is
a bank's money which is involved, 138 it is likely that such courts
would view a loan participation purchased by a bank as a commer-
cial transaction and not a security. On the other hand, although a
lending bank deals directly with the borrower, a participating bank
is a step removed from the borrower, is relying on the judgment and
managerial efforts of another, and consequently is in greater need
of the acts' protection. 39
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Commercial/Investment Dichotomy-The Rationale
Most bank loans and bank loan participations are securities
within the literal wording of the securities acts, but the judicially
created commercial/investment dichotomy which has evolved over
the last five years frequently excludes bank loan transactions from
the coverage of the securities acts; 4 ' this doctrine could also be
applied as a basis for a determination that a loan participation is
not an investment contract."' Yet the evolution and application of
138. See notes 95 & 96 and accompanying text supra.
139. The element of reliance on another party's managerial efforts has been called the
most important element in the Howey formula, and hence of primary significance in deter-
mining a "security." Investment Contracts, supra note 111, at 170-74. For a court that is
convinced that the commercial/investment analysis should apply to banking transactions, the
element of reliance may not be as relevant. See notes 90-102 and accompanying text supra.
140. See notes 50-108 and accompanying text supra.




the dichotomy doctrine do not seem to reflect persuasive judicial
reasoning. The doctrine's origin in Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co. 142
was based on a minor inconsistency between the Securities and the
Exchange Acts, whereby an instrument immune from the antifraud
provisions of the latter was subject to those of the former.' Nothing
in the acts or their legislative histories supports the inferences sub-
sequently drawn by the courts from that inconsistency.'44 If Con-
gress had actually intended to distinguish between "investment"
and "commercial" notes, it could be expected to have clearly stated
that intention, rather than purposefully creating a small inconsis-
tency between two statutes, enacted a year apart, to imply such a
distinction. What Congress did say clearly in each Act was that a
security is "any note"; it is hardly to be supposed that Congress
could not foresee and therefore did not intend the very obvious and
significant impact of that wording on the many transactions involv-
ing notes.'
If, as it has been frequently said, the securities acts are for the
protection of investors,' the courts have erred in their application
of their commercial/investment analysis by too narrowly interpret-
ing the term "investment," and concluding that bank loans are
"commercial" transactions. An investment is the contribution of
one's money to another in the expectation that the latter will make
the money grow through his employment of it.' Generally, that is
precisely what occurs when a bank makes a loan to or for a busi-
ness.' The courts, however, have held that bank loans constitute
142. 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972).
143. See notes 58-66 and accompanying text supra.
144. See notes 58-96 and accompanying text supra. Indeed, the court in McClure v. First
Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975), recognized that
its decision did not comport with the literal meaning of the statutes. See note 81 supra.
145. In contrast with this argument, the Third Circuit stated in Lino v. City Investing
Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973), that if Congress had intended the Exchange Act to reach
the note before the court it "most certainly would have given a real indication of such an
intent." Id. at 695. Consistent with Lino, Professor Loss, has commented that because all
definitions apply unless the context otherwise requires, "[iut might be argued that Congress
would have been more explicit if it had intended to provide a federal civil remedy in the
context of the ordinary promissory note." 1 L. Loss, SECUrnES REGULATION 546 (2d ed. 1961).
146. See note 73 supra.
147. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-301 (1946).
148. See, e.g., C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975). The court stated:
In one sense every lender of money is an investor since he places his money at risk in
anticipation of a profit in the form of interest. Also in a broad sense every investor lends
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no investment unless the bank becomes an actual shareholder in the
borrower, " ' or the loan proceeds are used for capital expenditures.' '0
The former requirement fails to recognize that equity and debt may
both be securities; ,5' the latter one ignores the fact that repayment
of the loan with interest is dependent on the success of the business
regardless of the use made of the loan.
The Supreme Court has noted in Forman that the focus of the
securities acts is on the capital market of the enterprise system-the
procurement of capital for profit-making purposes.'52 Bank loans for
beginning, operating, and expanding enterprises are part of that
capital market, and in extending loans, banks "invest" in the bor-
rowers' businesses within the common meaning of that term and as
it has been employed by the Supreme Court in Howey and Forman.
Calling such loans "commercial," without persuasively drawing the
distinction between the terms "commercial" and "investment,"
does not alter their investment character. Applying the Supreme
Court's Forman standard to bank loan participations, the solicita-
tion of purchasers to take an overline or liquidity participation is,
in substance, the solicitation of capital. The lead bank, undercap-
italized or overextended, needs capital to carry on its business of
lending money, and the business borrower is indirectly procuring
capital from the participant. "3 When a bank with surplus funds
seeks to purchase participations, it is carrying on its business of
placing capital for profit. When capital is placed with a business,
an investment-the hallmark of a security-occurs.
his money to a borrower who uses it for a price and is expected to return it one day.
Id. at 1359. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the notes at issue were not securities since
the bank involved was neither an investor nor a copartner in the borrower's business.
149. Id. at 1362-63. See also Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1113 (5th Cir.
1974); Thorp Commercial Corp. v. Northgate Indus., Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,929 (D. Minn. 1974).
150. See McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 494 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 930 (1975); MacAndrews & Forbes Co. v. American Barmag Corp., 339 F. Supp. 1401
(D.S.C. 1972).
151. See note 128 and accompanying text supra. See Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross
& Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1136 (2d Cir. 1976) ("securities laws cover debt, even supposedly gilt-
edged debt, as well as equity").
152. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975).
153. This is accurate despite the fact that the participation may well have been purchased
as an accomodation to a correspondent bank. See notes 14-19 and accompanying text supra.
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B. The Commercial/Investment Dichotomy- The Purpose
A court's purposes for applying the commercial/investment doc-
trine to remove some notes, particularly those involved in bank
loans, from the coverage of the securities acts are as unpersuasive
as the rationale of the doctrine itself. Several reasons have been
expressed in support of using the analysis to remove these transac-
tions from the acts' protection, predominantly, the floodgate philos-
ophy. But fear of the litigious masses should not be a basis for
statutory interpretation, although it may be a relevant factor to
consider in a close case. Moreover, the statutes do not seem to need
such narrow interpretation." 4 A seldom articulated reason for ex-
cluding notes from the acts' coverage appears to be the courts'
disbelief that Congress intended what the acts state. Yet it is hard
to believe that Congress could not have intended the acts to mean
what they say. In any event, the courts' "common sense" approach
should not supplant a clearly stated congressional mandate; it is a
familiar principle that the judiciary may not substitute its judg-
ment for a legislative determination unless the latter has been
proven to be patently arbitrary. 15
It has also been argued that banks do not need the protection of
the securities acts, and, consequently, bank loans should not be
construed as involving securities. 15 This implies that a functional
approach should be adopted by the courts, under which a security
is defined as much in terms of its participants as in terms of the
transaction itself. Utilizing this approach, for the securities laws to
apply, a certain type of financial transaction must occur, and those
particularly involved must need special protection. 15 Attractive as
154. See notes 143-45 and accompanying text supra.
155. See Carter, Bank Loans and Bank Credit Agreements: Federal Securities Laws
Status, 93 BANKING L.J. 1020, 1030 (1976). The Supreme Court had held that a court must
follow the letter of a statute unless it would lead to absurdity so gross as to shock the general
moral or common sense. Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 59-60 (1930). The Court has since
modified its standard, holding that a court may justifiably depart if the letter of the law
produces a result plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation. United States v.
American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542-43 (1939). It can be argued that the proponents
of the commercial/investment dichotomy have not met either test in their construction and
application of the securities acts.
156. E.g., Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 1976) (Wright,
J., concurring).
157. See, e.g., Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaning-
ful Formula?, 18 CASE W. RES. L. Rv. 367 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Coffey].
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such an approach may be, there is no basis for it in the statutes'
or in the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court. 59 On the con-
trary, it is the Court's pronouncement that the securities acts are
aimed broadly at the capital market.6 0 The primary objective of the
acts is to impose a high standard of conduct on capital seekers by
requiring full and fair disclosure of all material facts involved in a
sale or purchase.' By requiring registration of certain securities
offerings, and through the threat of private suits, the acts' objective
is expected to be attained; only when these other requirements have
failed are the antifraud sanctions applied. If the primary purpose
of construing a business venturer's promissory note to a bank as a
security is to ensure a high standard of conduct on the part of the
note's maker in its search for capital, and only secondarily to protect
the bank, then the securities acts should apply to bank loans regard-
less of the bank's need for protection. Furthermore, many cases have
involved claims by the note makers against their banks;'62 holding
that the transaction does not involve a security because the bank
does not need protection leaves a defrauded borrower simply unpro-
tected. That was manifestly not the intent of Congress when it
prohibited fraud in the purchase or sale of any security. Congress
clearly intended to protect all parties to a transaction; determining
that the note is not a security eviscerates the congressional intent.
Finally, banks may also be defrauded, particularly in the broad
sense of the securities acts. 63 There is, as well, a failure by courts
which adopt the premise that banks do not need the protection of
the securities acts to perceive that there are widely varied levels of
sophistication among different banks' managements, and that some
such managements may be in great need of the protection of the
acts. In any event, if banks do not need the protection of the acts,
they will not avail themselves of it. The litigation floodgates will not
be breached from that quarter, and Congress' protective benevo-
158. Id. at 408-09.
159. See cases cited at note 114 supra.
160. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975).
161. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
162. See, e.g., McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 930 (1975); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974).
163. See, e.g., Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969);
NBI Mortgage Inv. Corp. v. Chemical Bank, [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
95,632 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1976); Thorp Commercial Corp. v. Northgate Indus., Inc., [1974-
1975 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,929 (D. Minn. 1974).
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lence will, as to banks, be merely a solicitous but patronizing ges-
ture.
C. The Commercial/Investment Dichotomy-"Unless the Context
Otherwise Requires"
The argument that notes differ from one another is valid: in light
of the Supreme Court's view in Forman, only those notes which
represent investments may be securities.' 4 This principle may be
applied in specific cases through the construction of the introduc-
tory clause of the securities acts, "unless the context otherwise re-
quires." '65 Placed in context, a note might not be subject to the acts
where it does not represent an investment, as in the case of con-
sumer financing.' 6 Certainly, loans to businesses are not securities
per se. A valid distinction might well be drawn between a loan to a
florist shop to purchase a delivery van, secured by a purchase money
security interest in the van, and the financing of a fleet of trucks,
similarly secured, for a hauling company. The former resembles a
consumer transaction; in the latter, the bank has financed a sub-
stantial portion of the business' capital assets.' 7
D. Loan Participation as a Security
If the lead bank's loan and the borrower's note to the lead are
164. See notes 73, 89 & 146-53 and accompanying text supra.
165. The commentators and courts considering these questions have uniformly construed
the statutory "context" language as referring to the facts of the particular case to which the
securities acts are being applied. There is an equally plausible argument that the clause refers
to the contexts of the various sections of the securities acts. In SEC v. National Sec., Inc.,
393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969), the Court observed:
The meaning of particular phrases must be determined in context . . . .Congress
itself has cautioned that the same words may take on a different coloration in different
sections of the securities laws; both the 1933 and the 1934 Acts preface their lists of
general definitions with the phrase 'unless the context otherwise requires.'
The Court then examined the meaning of "purchase or sale" in the context of § 10(b) of the
Exchange Act.
166. See cases cited at note 89 and accompanying text supra. The Supreme Court's
determination in Forman that shares in a cooperative housing project were not securities was
based largely on its finding that the shares were purchased to acquire living quarters, not for
profit, and that the term "shares" was a misnomer, since what was involved was a rental
security deposit. 421 U.S. at 851. This determination was bolstered by the fact that the shares
paid no dividends and could not be transferred for profit.
167. The opinion in Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d
Cir. 1976), suggests kinds of business loans that similarly might not constitute securities for
the purposes of the acts.
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investment in nature, and therefore a security under the commer-
cial/investment doctrine, then a participation sold in a loan would
be a security by virtue of the language of the acts.' 8 Regardless of
the status of the underlying loan and note, however, a participation
sold in them may be an "investment contract," and in that case it
would be determined to be a security. An investment contract re-
sults when one invests in a common enterprise with the expectation
of profit from another's entrepreneurial or managerial efforts.," In
a participation, the lead and participant are engaged in a common
enterprise-the letting of money to a particular borrower-and the
participant expects to profit. There is an investment by the partici-
pant to the extent that it seeks this profit through allowing the lead
the use of its money to earn money. The nature of the loan partici-
pated in should not control the question of investment, because
there is no relationship between the participant and the borrower.
The participant contributes to the lead's enterprise, not the enter-
prise of the borrower.
The controlling question should be whether the participant ex-
pects its profit to come from the entrepreneurial or managerial ef-
forts of the lead bank. If a participation is purchased without knowl-
edge about the loan, such as a participation purchased in a lead's
loan pool, the transaction clearly constitutes an investment con-
tract. Otherwise, a factual determination should be made in which
factors of information and control of the loan proceeds would be
particularly relevant. If, for example, the participant has direct
access to the borrower for gathering information before and after
purchasing the participation, and shares control with the lead over
administration of the loan, the participant clearly is not signifi-
cantly relying on the efforts of the lead bank. If the participation
agreement gives the participant no share in the administration of
the loan, the participant must rely on the lead's efforts, regardless
of what information may be available. Conversely, a right of control
is meaningless if the participant would be unable to obtain the
information necessary to make management decisions 7 0 When the
participant has both authority over the loan and access to the infor-
168. See notes 40-108 and accompanying text supra.
169. See notes 122-33 and accompanying text supra.
170. Commentators have recognized the importance of shared information and control.
See, e.g., Investment Contracts, supra note 111, at 170-74; Coffey, supra note 157, at 396-98.
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mation necessary to effectively assist the lead in administering it,
the participant is not relying on the entrepreneurial and managerial
efforts of the lead within the meaning of the Howey test,"' and there
is no investment contract. Absent either or both of these key ele-
ments, information and control, the participant must rely on the
lead; what the participant has purchased is an investment contract,
bringing it within the protection of the federal securities acts.
IV. CONCLUSION
Under a literal reading of section 2(1)172 of the Securities Act, and
section 3(a)(10)"7 of the Exchange Act, a bank loan participation
agreement is a security as was held in Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v.
Central National Bank.'74 Under the current course of decisions in
the federal courts that apply the "commercial/investment dichot-
omy," it is rather unlikely that a participation agreement would be
governed by the rationale of Lehigh Valley. Despite a forceful de-
nunciation of the dichotomy concept in Exchange National Bank
v. Touche Ross & Co. ,1 the approach seems firmly entrenched in a
majority of the federal circuits, and intervention by Congress or the
Supreme Court would be necessary to displace the analysis. With
the issue clearly framed by the two most recent decisions, Great
Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz,'76 suggesting that bank loans and
their notes presumptively are not securities,' and Exchange Na-
tional Bank, holding that they presumptively are securities,' 8 the
question of when "any note" is a security is ripe for decision by the
Supreme Court.
Whether it comes from Congress or the Court, however, clarifica-
tion is required, because the commercial/investment dichotomy is
legally unsound in its present application by the courts, and because
it does not facilitate the purpose of the securities acts as explain-
ed by the Supreme Court in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
171. See notes 125-39 and accompanying text supra.
172. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
173. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970).
174. 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969).
175. 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).
176. 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
177. See notes 90-96 and accompanying text supra.
178. See notes 97-103 and accompanying text supra.
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Forman;'7 9 moreover, the meaning of "investment" and "investors,"
and the status of bank financing under the acts need to be inter-
preted. It should be recognized that bank loan participation agree-
ments constitute securities when the underlying loan and note are
investment in nature. Furthermore, participation agreements
should constitute investment contracts, and hence securities, be-
tween lead bank and participant when the participant significantly
relies on the efforts of the lead bank to obtain a return on its invest-
ment.
STEPHEN JURMAN
179. 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975). See also notes 146-53 and accompanying text supra.
